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Thomas C. Kohler· LESSONS FROM THE SOCIAL CHARTER: 
STATE, CORPORATION, AND THE 
MEANING OF SUBSIDIARITYt 
A great democratic revolution is taking place in our midst; everybody sees it, but 
by no means everybody judges it in the same way. Some think it a new thing and, 
supposing it an accident, hope that they can still check it; others think it 
irresistible, because it seems to them the most continuous, ancient, and permanent 
tendency known to history.1 
- Alexis de Tocqueville 
We are well underway toward recognition that property used in production must 
conform to conceptions of civilization worked out through democratic processes 
of American constitutional government. Few American enterprises, and no large 
corporations, can take the view that their plants, tools and organizations are their 
own, and that they can do what they please with their own. There is increasing 
recognition of the fact that collective operations, and those predominantly 
conducted by large corporations, are like operations carned on by the state itself. 
Corporations are essentially political constructs ... an adjunct of the state itself.2 
- Adolphe Berle 
We may be approaching full circle in the West, from the distant era when 
decentralized economic power was strategic to the emergence of personal freedom 
and the birth of a 'new kind of community [the Greek city-state, that] rested on 
economic independence' to the present stage of evolution where economic free-
dom has produced an environment dominated by vast, impersonal organizations 
that pride themselves on their rootlessness (the 'international' corporations) and 
• Boston College Law School 
t This paper reflects research on a larger study in which the author is engaged. He 
gratefully acknowledges the aid of the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and the gene-
rous support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation in the pursuit of his work. 
1 Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America (13th ed. 1850) J.P. Mayer (ed.) George 
Lawrence (trans.) (Anchor Books 1969) 9 
2 Adolph Berle 'Preface' in Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means The Modem Corporation 
and Privak Property rev. ed. (1967) xxvi. In the portion of the quote deleted above, 
Berle states: 'Their [the business corporations'] perpetual life, their capacity to 
accumulate tens of billions of assets, and to draw profit from their productions and 
roles, has made them part of the service of supply of the United States. Informally, 
they are an adjunct of the state itself.' In 1989, Cyrill Siewart, the chief financial officer 
of the Colgate-Palmolive Co., stated that '[t]he United States does not have an 
automatic call on our resources. There is no mind set that puts this country first.' 
Uchitelle 'U.S. Business Loosens Unk to Mother Country' N.Y. Times 21 May 1989. 
See also Robert B. Reich 'Who Is Them?' (March-April 1991) Haro. Bus. Rev. 77. 
(1993),43 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO lAW JOURNAL 607 
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that respond only to material incentives. These corporations have helped created 
enormous wealth, but in the process they have broken down traditional commu-
nity links and brought forth new problems ... Governments have grown large and 
potent along with large firms, but they continue to lose the power of initiative in 
a world o( increasingly rapid change, international mobility of resources, and 
internal political conflict and stalemates.' 
- Edward Herman 
In his 1990 Chorley Lecture, Lord Wedderburn declared that 'it is time 
for British labour law to take a good look at itself, to examine its own 
structure.'4 Observing Freud's advice, Lord Wedderburn notes that a 
premature invitation to self-analysis 'risks a response of "resistance, re-
jection and indignation." '5 The impending single market in Western Eu-
rope, the ongoing metamorphoses of what used to be the Eastern Bloc, 
and the increasing internationalization of the world's economy make clear 
that the time for self-examination is ripe and can be avoided no longer. 
This self-analysis, Lord Wedderburn adds, must include a comparative 
dimension, which involves 'not the foolish search for institutions to 
import from elsewhere but the stretching of the imagination and of the 
agenda by inquiry into unfamiliar legal treatments of familiar social 
problems and in so doing to follow the argument wherever it leads.'6 
Lord Wedderburn's advice equally aptly can be directed to the United 
States - and possibly to Canada as well. Moreover, his call for critical self-
analysis might with similar appropriateness be extended from employ-
ment law to the law that structures the corporate entities that do the 
employing. For reasons of curricular convenience as well as many others, 
labour and corporate law are treated as distinct functional specialties. 
Nevertheless, as we all know, the two areas are mutually conditioning. 
Challenges to, and changes in one, necessarily affect the other. Likewise, 
neither field stands in isolation from the sorts of issues that confront 
. political and social culture generally. As F.W. Maitland long ago 
observed, when all is said, there seems to be a genus of which state and 
corporation are species. They seem to be permanently organized groups 
of men; they seem to be group units; we seem to attribute acts and 
intents, rights or wrongs, to these groups, to these units.7 
3 Edward Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power (1981) 301 (footnote omitted) 
4 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton 'The Social Charter in Britain - Labour Law and 
Labour Courts?' (Chorley Lecture 1990) (1991) 54 Mod. LR 1. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Frederick W. Maitland 'Translator's Introduction' in Otto Gierke Political Theories 
of the Middle Age (1900) ix. Maitland continues by observing, 'Let it be allowed that 
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The permanence of the sovereign, juridical nation-state seems open 
to question. Many have declared it an institution in eclipse,s and the New 
Europe hopefully envisioned through the events of 1992 lends that 
judgment some real credence. The business corporation, in contrast, 
seems more robust than ever. A fictive creature whose existence 
supposedly depends upon the sovereign's recognition and sufferance,9 the 
corporation increasingly appears to have transcended both the nation-
state's boundaries and powers. This does not mean - pace Marx - that 
government is about to whither away. It does mean that the patterns 
the State is a highly peculiar group unit; still it may be asked whether we ourselves 
are not the slaves of' a jurist's theory and a little behind the age of Darwin. if 
between the State and all other groups we fix an unmeasurable gulf .. .' Ibid. Of 
course, while the term corporation includes the business corporation, Gierke means 
it to encompass other sorts of corporate groups as well. 
8 For one recent account of the rise and decline of the modern nation-state, see Steven 
Toulmin Cosmopolis: TM Hidden Agmda of Modernity (1990) arguing in part that the 
modern notion of the sovereign nation-state was a product of the 'quest for certainty' 
characteristic of 17th-century nationalism that also produced the split between the 
human and natural sciences - or, as it is sometimes spoken of, the distinction between 
verstehen and tTlclaren (in short, that notion that the human sciences, at best, only 
understand, but the natural sciences explain). Characteristic of the 'post-modern' era, 
Toulmin predicts, will be an emphasis both on subnational mediating groups as well 
as transnational institutions, accompanied by a recovery of practical (praxis) 
philosophy, which can consider the 'concrete, timely and the particular.' For one classic 
account of the origins of state absolutism and the development of the modern juridical 
state, see John Neville Figgis Studies of Political ThoughJ from Gerson to Grotiw, 1414-1625 
(1907). On the rise and development of modernity generally, see Leo Strauss 'The 
Three Waves of Modernity' in Hilail Golden (ed.) An Introduction to Political PhiI.osophy: 
Ten Essays ITy uo Strauss (Wayne State 1989). For a powerfully insightful and 
comprehensive critique of postmodernism generally, and the implications for liberal 
democracy, see Thomas Pangle The Ennobling of Democracy: TM Challenge of the 
Postmodern Era (1992). 
9 This is the theory in Anglo-American law, e.g., 'Dartmouth College v. Woodward' 17 us 
(4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819). This notion has been extended to various other forms of 
corporate bodies, e.g., labor unions. See, e.g., International Longshorl!'l1le1l's Assoc. v. Allied 
Int. Inc. 456 us 212, 225-6 (1982) (stating that 'the considerable powers of a "national 
labor union" and "its locals" are derived ... under federal laws'). The Dartmouth College 
case is representative of the 'fiction' theory of corporations, while the AUied case reflects 
a 'concession' theory. The fiction theory posits that only individuals are real persons 
in law, and all other institutions simply represent an 'artificial person' (this includes 
the state - which Thomas Hobbes, whose voluntarist account of association has had 
enormous influence in our legal and political theory, described as 'that great 
LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or Sf ATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an 
Artificiall Man'). T. Hobbes Leviathan (1657) C.B. McPherson (ed.) (1984) 81. The 
concession theory, in contrast, posits that rights and powers granted to fictive persons 
are concessions made to them by the state. For two classic critiques of the fiction and 
concession theories, see John Neville Figgis Churches in the Modern State (1913) and Otto 
Gierke, supra note 7. On the business corporation and us legal and social policy, see 
James Willard Hurst The ugitifllilCJ of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United 
States, 1780-1970 (1970). 
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through which we order our lives together are changing, and that law 
and lawyers face new circumstances that call for new ways of thinking 
and acting. 
Certainly, American judges and lawyers are not at all accustomed to 
looking abroad for examples or for sources of inspiration. Like American 
business, American law, until quite recently, has tended to remain 
inward-looking. We have assumed that the rest of the world had little to 
tell us, and that others would simply follow our lead. Indeed, we rarely 
have bothered even to read the opinions of courts in our sister common 
law jurisdictions, much less pay attention to what anyone else might be 
doing. As a result, our treatment of various issues frequently has staked 
out a place at the far end of the spectrum.IO American exceptionalism has 
not been without its blessings. But, marching to the beat of a different 
drummer is not necessarily a sign that the marcher is either a genius or 
the graced recipient of some special revelation. It may simply indicate the 
marcher's need for a reality check. The dangers inherent in the smug 
assumption that our way is always best are too clear to be ignored. 
As Maitland points out, state and corporation are species of the same 
genus. Both represent forms of community. As such, either institution 
will flourish only so long as people hold judgments, aims, and meanings 
in common. That community sets the conditions for willing cooperation, 
which in turn forms the basis of legitimate power.ll Cooperation, how-
ever, is not simply a derivative of specific individual consent. Hence, its 
achievement represents more than the voluntary aggregation of indivi-
dual wills. People are by nature social beings. Consequently, cooperation 
in a real sense is a transcendent characteristic. We are constituted to do 
it; hence, it represents an activity to which we are spontaneously 
inclined. 12 
Nevertheless, we don't blindly cooperate with just anybody, nor dumb-
ly go along with just any scheme. We may be social, but even more 
powerfully, we are intelligent beings. We want reasons for what we do. 
We don't undertake any activity until we have at least implicitly decided 
that it's in some way worthwhile. Consequently, whether and the extent 
10 For an extended analysis of this tendency. see Mary Ann Glendon Abortion and 
Divorce in Western lAw (1987). 
11 On this topic. see Bernard J.F. Lonergan Insight: A Study of Human Understanding 
(1958) (Harper & Row 1978) 173-244; Bernard J.F. Lonergan 'Dialectic of Au-
thority' in Frederick E. Crowe (ed.) A ThiTd Collection: Papers by BtrnaTdJ.F. Lonergan 
(1985) 5. 
12 On the spontaneous character of human sociality. see sources cited in note 11. 
supra. Also see the discussion of this topic in Frederich A Hayek lAw. Legislalion 
and Liberty: Rules and Order vol. 1 (University of Chicago 1973) 35-54. 
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to which we will conform our actions and subordinate our personal inte-
rests to the rules of some social order depends upon our judgment that 
the order is a reasonable one. Political regimes, social institutions, and 
economic orders that don't make sense eventually collapse. As the wreck-
age from Eastern and Central Europe attests, counter-positions do indeed 
eventually reverse themselves. The old song notwithstanding, fairy tales 
don't come true - despite sustained efforts to transmute fictions into fact. 
The pretenses of what Eric Voegelin called second realitiesu cannot 
permanently keep actuality from stubbornly popping back into view. 
None of this denies that reason and good intentions can be and often 
are subverted, that mistakes are made, or that biases not infrequently 
displace responsible judgment. It simply suggests that none of these 
conditions is enduring. Our need to make sense out of what we are doing 
forces us to face up to the inconsistencies and incoherence that are the 
products of our rationalizations. Nonsensical programs, institutions and 
social orders thereby eventually lose their supporters. 
Consequently, the organization of governmental, corporate, and like 
social institutions encounter the same challenge: To flourish, they need 
to take advantage of our spontaneous sociality in a way that can satisfy 
our innate demand for reasonable living. This involves more than top-
down structural concerns. Individuals and institutions stand in a 
reflexive,' mutually conditioning relationship. 14 Human institutions 
function no better than do the people who operate within them. Yet, 
those institutions set the conditions and establish the norms for our day-
to-day performance. Over time, the one will be not better than the other. 
A decline in either puts the other at risk. Thus, the trick lies in coming 
up with flexible patterns of ordering that give individuals the greatest 
possible opportunity to make decisions and that also require them to live 
with the results. In other words, the challenge is to find patterns of 
ordering that promote and sustain authentically responsible and 
reasonable habits of living. 
Because state and corporation comprise people, there is a horizontal 
aspect to this problem as well. Our natural sociality inclines us towards 
cooperation, but some commonality of understandings, judgments, 
sentiments, and aims is the glue that sustains it. Getting out of touch with 
one another puts that commonality at risk and ultimately throws the 
13 Eric Voegelin 'The Eclipse of Reality' in Maurice Natanson (ed.) Phenomenology and 
Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred SchiUz (1970) 185 
14 Perhaps the best-known exposition of this point is contained in Alexis de 
Tocqueville, supra note I, passim. The point is of ancient lineage; see, e.g., Aristotle 
Politics, Books I, III, v, and VI. 
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legitimacy of the authority of our organizations into question. By 
sustaining the relationship among the members of a group, webs of 
conversation support and refresh the commonality and consensus that 
cooperation requires. But, that is not the only benefit. There is a 
normativity to conversation. It displays itself in the way people engaged 
in conversation attempt to explain and to justify to one another their 
decisions, judgments, and plans. Get your opponent talking, Plato ad-
vised, and soon enough the problems in his position will evince them-
selves. Conversations act like a gyroscope. By continually exposing 
individuals and activities to the test of reasonableness and intelligibility, 
they increase the likelihood that individuals and their institutions will stay 
on track and authentically make sense, both in small terms and large. 
Institutions organized to promote conversation offer yet a further 
benefit. They encourage and can take advantage of the insights of all 
their members about the most effective ways to achieve the organizations' 
purposes. They recognize that innovations are likely to come from the 
man or woman on the spot, who actually performs the work or provides 
the service. These last points, all of which have been adopted by 
participative management theory, 15 need no further elaboration. What 
such theories implicitly recognize is that the capacity for insight is the 
most distinctly human of abilities. 
Briefly stated, Maitland was right: state and corporation are members 
of the same 'family.' As such, they face the same sorts of challenges and 
are prone to the same types of ills. To succeed, their organizational 
arrangements need to be consistent with our character as free, intelligent, 
and responsible beings. To the extent our organizational patterns fall 
short of this, they retard rather than promote the common good and 
waste assets, both human and material. The widespread and continuing 
dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the corporate governance structure 
to account for stakeholders' interests, the growing uncertainty about the 
character and direction of employment law, and the mounting evidence 
that us business cannot flexibly respond to changes in the world economy 
all suggest the same conclusion: Maybe we need a new and more compre-
hensive way to think about organizations generally, one that is more 
consistent with our character as humans. Such a principle would permit 
us to reconsider not only the relationship between the corporation and 
15 On participative management theories and their sources, see Thomas C. Kohler 
'Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2)' 
(1986) 27 BCLR 49~, 499-518. Also see Julius Getman and Thomas C. Kohler 
'M&hanismes de Participation des Travailleurs aux Etats-Unis' (1983) Joumies de 10. 
Sociiti de Ugislation Comparee 55. 
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employees as stakeholders, but the relation between the corporation and 
the society at large. Following Lord Wedderburn's advice, this paper will 
pursue that question in comparative perspective. It will examine the new 
Social Charter of the European Community and its principle of sub-
sidiarity, by which all manner of institutional arrangements are to be 
patterned. 
The Social ChaTter and the principle of subsidiarity 
In December 1989, the European Community adopted its Charter on 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers - the Social Charter.16 It sets 
forth a comprehensive stipulation of twelve basic rights and policies that 
address the 'social dimension' of the Community's internal market 
programY As its preamble makes clear, the principles of the Social 
Charter constitute an integral and organic part of the single market 
scheme. Thus, the preamble declares 'solemnly that the implementation 
of the Single European Act must take full account of the social dimension 
of the Community.'18 The preamble further states that 'the same 
importance must be attached to the social aspects as to the economic 
aspects'19 in establishing the single market, and requires that these two 
dimensions 'must be developed in a balanced manner.'20 
16 Social Charter, Com (89) 471 (final) (hereinafter Social Charter or Charter). (Of 
the twelve member nations, only the United Kingdom refused to sign the Charter.) 
The literature on the Charter is rather extensive. See Philippa Watson 'The 
Community Social Charter' (1991) 28 Common Mkt. LR 37 and sources collected in 
nl; Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, supra note 4, and sources cited therein; Brian 
Bercusson 'The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers' (1990) 53 Mod. LR 624; Bob Hepple 'The Implementation of the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights' (1990) 53 Mod. LR 643. See also 
sources cited in notes 21 and 25, infra. 
17 Those rights and polices include: (I) freedom of movement; (2) policies concern-
ing fair remuneration; (3) improvement of living and working standards, including 
rights to annual and weekly leaves; (4) social protections; (5) the right to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining; (6) vocational training policies; (7) equal 
treatment of the sexes; (8) worker's right to information and to participation in 
decision-making; (9) health and safety protections; (10) adequate retirement income; 
(11) child work protections; and (12) policies to integrate the disabled into the 
workplace. A useful summary of the Social Charter's provisions can be found in 
Declan Costello 'Social Policy' in Peter Ludlow (ed.) TM Annual Review of EUTo~an 
Commumt, Affairs. 1990 (Centre for European Policy Studies 1991) 118. 
18 Social Charter, Preamble, paragraph 14 
19 Ibid. Preamble, paragraph 2 
20 Ibid. 
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The principles announced in the Social Charter grew out of an 
informal 'social dialogue' between European-level trade union and 
employers' organizations.21 The discussions between these 'social partners' 
were supplemented and formalized by Commission actions that resulted 
in the promulgation of the present Charter." Despite its formal adoption, 
however, the Social Charter has no legally binding effect. As the 
preamble states, the Charter simply constitutes 'the solemn proclamation 
of fundamental social rights.'2s The responsibility for implementing the 
Charter's policies remains with the member states. The manner of their 
implementation, however, is to be in accord with the 'principle of 
subsidiarity.'24 
Subsidiarity constitutes one of the Social Charter's core principles, and 
it illuminates much of the Charter's meaning. Subsidiarity not only states 
a norm for structuring the relationship between the EC and its member 
states, but suggests a principle for arranging the order of all sorts of 
corporate social institutions. 'Subsidiarity is a term that has become part 
of Eurospeak,' Guenther Schaefer observes.25 'A few years ago hardly 
anyone, outside perhaps some German politicians and legal experts, used 
the term ... Nowadays everyone is talking about subsidiarity and everyone 
uses a different definition.'26 Perhaps it is the term's relative novelty plus 
the welter of uses to which it's been put that led Lord Wedderburn to 
describe subsidiarity as 'that principle of feline inscrutability and political 
subtlety.'27 
Subsidiarity may be a subtle principle, but it is hardly an inscrutable 
one. Its likeness to cats rests only in its flexibility. Simply put, subsidiarity 
is an organizational norm: It recommends that social institutions of all 
21 On the development of this dialogue, see Commission of the European Com-
munities Social Europe: TM Social Dimension oftM Internal Market (1988) 188 (Annex 
10: Note on the Implementation of the Community Social Dialogue). This informal 
dialogue was instituted in 1985. It was acknowledged and institutionalized by the 
addition (through Article 22 of the Single European Act) of Article 118B of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty], which 
provides: 'The Commission shall endeavor to develop the dialogue between 
management and labor at [the] European level which could, if the two sides 
consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement: On these points, also 
see the discussion in John T. Addison and W. Stanley Siebert 'The Social Chater 
of the European Community: Evolution and Controversies' (1991) 44 Industrial & 
Lab. Rei. Rev. 597. 
22 On these subsequent Commission actions, see Bercusson, supra note 16, 624. 
23 Social Charter, Preamble, paragraph 17 
24 Ibid. Preamble, paragraph 16 
25 Guenther Schaefer 'Institutional Choices: The Rise and Fall of Subsidiarity' (1991) 
23 Futures 681, 687 
26 Ibid. 
27 Lord Wedderburn, supra note 4, 14 
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types be ordered so that decision-making can occur at the lowest capable 
level. The principle insists that the state and all other forms of com-
munity exist for the individual. Thus, corporate bodies should not take 
up what individuals can do, nor should larger groups assume what 
smaller associations can accomplish. Conversely, the state and other large 
corporate bodies have the responsibility to undertake those tasks that 
neither individuals nor smaller associations can perform.28 On this view, 
communities and soCial relationships exist to supply help (subsUlium) to 
individuals in assuming self-responsibility. The subsidiary function of 
community rests not in displacing but in setting the conditions for 
authentic self-rule. 
The seemingly exotic aura about subsidiarity that Lord Wedderburn's 
description suggests may stem more from the provenance of the principle 
than its substance. As Guenther Schaefer points out, the principle has its 
roots in Catholic social thought.29 The Catholic social tradition received 
its start in the mid-nineteenth Century in Germany,50 which remained an 
28 One commentator has described subsidiarity as consisting of the following nine 
elements: '(I) The priority of the person as the origin and purpose of society: civitas 
prf1Jter civt.!, non civt.! propter civitatem. (2) At the same time, the human person is 
naturally social, only able to achieve self-realization in and through social relationships 
- what is sometimes called the 'principle of solidarity.' (3) Social relationships and 
communities exist to provide help (subsidium) to individuals in their free but obligatory 
assumption ofresponsibility for their own self-realization. This 'subsidiary' function of 
society is not a matter, except in exceptional circumstances, of substituting or supplying 
for individual self-responsibility, but of providing the sets of conditions necessary for 
personal self-realization. (4) Larger, 'higher' communities exist to perform the same 
subsidiary roles toward smaller, 'lower' communities. (5) The principle of subsidiarity 
requires positively that all communities not only permit but enable and encourage 
individuals to exercise their own self-responsibility and that larger communities do the 
same for smaller ones. (6) It requires negatively that communities not deprive 
individuals and smaller communities of their right to exercise their self-responsibility. 
Intervention, in other words, is only appropriate as 'helping people help themselves.' 
(7) Subsidiarity, therefore, serves as the principle by which to regulate competencies 
between individuals and communities and between smaller and larger communities. 
(8) It is a formal principle, needing determination in virtue of the nature of a 
community and of particular circumstances. (9) Because it is grounded in the 
metaphysics of the person, it applies to the life of every society.' Joseph A Komonchak 
'Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question' (1988) 48 jurist 298, 301. For 
further descriptions of the subsidiarity principle, see Schaefer, supra note 23, 687-91; 
Thomas C. Kohler 'Quadragesimo Anno' in George Weigel and Robert Royal (eds) 
A Century of Calholic Social ThoughJ: Essays on Rerum Novarum and Nine Other Key 
Documents (1991) 27. Cf. Mary Ann Glendon 'A Challenge to the Human Sciences' in 
George Weigel (ed.) A New Worldly Order: john Paulll and Human Freedom (1992) 79. 
29 Schaefer, supra note 25, 687. See also Markus Heintzen 'Subsidiaritatsprinzip und 
Europaische Gemeinschaft' 1991 juristen Zeitung 317. 
30 On the development of the social teachings, see Richard Camp The Papal Ideology of 
Social Reform: A Study in Historical Development, 1878-1967 (1969). See also the frequently 
cited work of Jean-Yves Calvez 5J and Jacques Perrin sJ The Church and Social justice: 
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important centre for social Catholicism until the mid-1930s, when the 
Nazis silenced its leading thinkers.s1 Social Catholicism arose in response 
to two developments: The severe social dislocations and urban poverty 
that attended the rise of the industrial revolution, and the challenges 
posed by critical social philosophy, particularly that of Marx. The social 
teachings might be described as meliorist. They early accepted market 
economies and social institutions like private property, but go on to 
characterize the sorts of responsibilities that the teachings stipulate are 
attached to the ownership of property and capitaP2 From the start, the 
social tradition has been concerned with establishing the conditions for 
The Social Teachings of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius XII (1878-1958) J.R. Kirwin (trans.) 
(1961). On the early background and development of social Catholicism, s~e Paul 
Misner Social Catlwlicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First World War 
(1991); Ralph H. Bowen German Theories of the Corporative State, with Special Reference to 
the Period 1870-1919 (1947) 75-118. Also helpful is the well-balanced study of William 
L. Patch Jr Christian Trade Unions in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933: The Failure of 
Corporate Pluralism (1985). For an impressively concise but comprehensive overview, see 
Franz H. Mueller The Church and the Social Question (American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research 1984). 
31 Many of these persons went into hiding or exile. One who did not was Oswald von 
Nell-Breuning, the leading theorist ofsocial Catholicism. He was officially silenced and 
his works banned in 1936; later he was arrested and sentenced to. prison. Nell-
Breuning was responsible both for giving the subsidiarity principle its name as well as 
its comprehensive formulation. Having survived the war, Nell-Breuning exerted an 
enormous influence on the social and economic structure of postwar Germany. Nell-
Breuning was a long-time adviser to the (West) German economics ministry (1948-65) 
and to the Deutsche Gewerkscho{tsbund (DGB), the German trade-union movement (who 
awarded him their highest honour, the Hans Bockler prize). Much of Nell-Breuning's 
thought also was adopted by the Social Democratic Pary (SPD) and integrated into its 
1959 Bad Godesburg Program, in which the party dropped its Marxist orientation and 
accepted a market economy. (As one commentator remarked, 'Nell-Breuning is so 
often quoted in [SPD] party discussions ... that he has become something of a focal 
point of party theorizing.' Douglas A Chalmers The Social Democratic Party of Germany: 
From Worlcing-Class Movement to Modem Political Party (1964) 218 n39. As an extension 
of the subsidiarity principle, Nell-Breuning also became an important theorist of, and 
a leading advocate for, worker co-determination (Mitbestimmung). For a brief account 
in English of the development of the co-determination principle, see Herbert]. Spiro 
The Politics of German Codetermination (1958). 
32 In so doing, the social teachings work an important qualification in the right to private 
property developed by John Locke in chapter 5 of The Second Treatise of Government 
(1689-90). As C.B. Macpherson points out, 'Locke's astonishing achievement was to 
base the property right on natural right, and then to remove all the natural law limits 
from property rights.' C.B. Macpherson The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: 
Hobbes to UJCM (1962) 199. These limits included traditional notions of obligations and 
stewardship that were conceived to·run with property ownership. On this point, also 
see Thomas Pangle The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American 
Founders and the Philosophy of liJcM (1988) 141-71. Also helpful is the incisive study by 
Ernest L. Fortin' "Sacred and Inviolable": Rerum Novarum and Natural Rights' (1992) 
53 Theological Studies 203. 
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authentic individual self-determination. Consequently, social Catholicism 
consistently has urged self-help through labour unions, producers' 
cooperatives, and other employee associations, supported by a limited 
program of social legislation. Likewise, the social teachings long have 
emphasized the properly delimited role of major corporate bodies, as 
well as the importance the of intermediate (or subsidiary) groups in the 
social order.55 The principle of subsidiarity was integral to the first papal 
social encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which was issued in 1891. It was not 
until the 1931 encyclical, 0wdragesimoAnno, however, that the principle 
received either its name or a comprehensive formulation. The principle 
subsequently has been invoked in the social encyclicals of every pope. 
Despite its development, subsidiarity properly has been described as 
'neither a theological nor even really a philosophical p~nciple, but a 
piece of congealed historical wisdom.'54 The noted philosopher and 
commentator Josef Pieper has termed it simply a 'German legal principle' 
(,deutsch-rechtlichen Grundsatz'),55 while the man who coined the term, 
Oswald von Nell-Breuning, stated that 'the principle is ancient' ('Die 
Sache ist uralt').56 More than one commentator has traced the roots of the 
subsidiarity principle to, among others, Aristotle, Montesquieu, and 
Abraham Lincoln.57 Certainly, the principle's themes are consistent 
with the insights of Tocqueville58 and John Dewey!9 on the sorts of 
33 These intermediate groups begin with the family and include unions and employers' 
associations, as well as other economic, political, social, and cultural groups. 
34 John Coleman 5j 'Development of Church Social Teaching' in Charles Curran and 
Richard A. McCormick 5j (eds) Readings in Moral Theology No.5: OffICial Catholic Social 
Teaching (1986) 169, 183 
35 Ewald Link Do.s SubsidiarittUsprinzip: Sein We.sm und seine Bedeutung fUT die Sozialethik 
v, quoted in Komonchak, supra note 28, 300 
36 Oswald von Nell-Breuning 5j 'Subsidiaritiitsprinzip' 7 StaLUslexikon 826, 826 (6th ed., 
1962) 
37 Komonchak, supra note 28, 298 nl (collecting sources). Indeed, Lincoln states that: 
'The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever 
they need to have done but cannot do at all, or cannot so well do for themselves in 
their separate and individual capacities. In all that the people can individually do as 
well for themselves, government ought not to interfere.' Nell-Breuning, supra note 36, 
838 
38 Supra note 1. The parallels between Tocqueville's insights and those of the susidiarity 
principle are very strong, particularly the emphasis both place on mediating groups, 
civil discourse, and the role mediating groups play in functioning as what Tocqueville 
called 'schools for democracy.' On these points, see Thomas C. Kohler 'Setting the 
Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and 
the Problem of DeBartolo' 1990 WIS. LR 149,200-9. 
39 Robert Westbrook provides the following summary of Dewey's thought: 'Among 
liberal intellectuals of the twentieth century, Dewey was the most important advocate 
of participatory democracy, that is, of the belief that democracy as an ethical ideal 
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arrangements that promote social cooperation and responsible self-
rule!O 
The historical wisdom that subsidiarity embodies stems from its 
practical understanding of human character. The principle stresses the 
primacy of individuals as free, reasonable, and responsible beings. 
Consequently, it understands that deliberating, judging, and choosing are 
the most characteristically human activities. The principle also under-
stands that as humans, we constitute ourselves by what we value, and 
even more importantly, by what we do. 
The link between our values and our actions is crucial. Our values 
orient and direct our activities, and our spontaneous demand to live 
reasonably subjects both of these elements to its scrutiny. As a result, we 
can't long countenance behaviour in ourselves that contradicts or falls 
short of our principles. We either clean up our act, attempt to rationalize 
our shortcomings, or come up with a new slate of values.41 The last-
mentioned possibility, however, hardly constitutes an escape route. What 
truly is valuable also is intelligible. Hence, 'values' that don't make sense, 
and the institutions that embody and transmit them eventually succumb 
.or are transformed. 
The second element of the anthropology of subsidiarity lies in its 
understanding of humans as situated beings.42 We do not reflect, choose, 
or act in isolation. As humans, we exist only in communities, and this fact 
fundamentally conditions the scope of our effective freedom. The com-
munities in which we live and perform our tasks give us an orientation 
and an identity. They tell us not only who we are, but what our lives, 
calls upon men and women to build commuruues in which the necessary 
opportunities and resources are available for every individual to realize fully his or 
her particular capacities and powers through participation in political, social and 
cultural life. This ideal rested on a "faith in the capacity of human beings for 
intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished," a faith, Dewey 
argued, "so deeply embedded in the methods which are intrinsic to democracy that 
when a professed democrat denies the faith he convicts himself of treachery to his 
profession.'" Robert B. Westbrook john Dewey and Amnican DemccTo.cy (1991) xiv-xv 
(footnote omitted) 
40 These themes also have appeal to a rather wide spectrum of views, e.g., Ernst F. 
Schumacher Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People MalteTed (1973); Peter L. Berger 
and Richard John Neuhaus To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in 
Public Policy (American Enterprise Institute Studies 139, 1977); Jane Jacobs Cities 
and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Ecurwmic Life (1984). 
41 On these points, see Lonergan Insight: A Stud, in Human Understanding, supra note 
11. 
42 The term is Michael Sanders; Michael J. Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of justice 
(1982) 21. 
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and thereby our work, mean.·5 Consequently, the sorts of questions we 
raise, whether and how clearly we recognize the ramifications that flow 
from our choices, and what kinds of roles are open to us in life, all are 
affected to a large degree by the various communities that pattern the 
meaning of our lives. Briefly stated, subsidiarity recognizes that indi-
viduals, corporate bodies of every sort, and culture exist in a normative 
and mutually conditioning relationship. Each influences the others, and 
over time all rise and decline together. Subsidiarity seeks to enhance the 
full development of human personality by promoting conditions in 
organizations of every sort that give individuals the greatest possible 
opportunity to reflect, choose, and act for themselves, and to take 
responsibility for the outcomes. The principle is in the best sense 
democratic. It exposes the actions and the rationale of individuals and 
institutions alike to the widest possible discussion and examination. It 
thereby activates and makes use of the most valuable of assets: the 
normativity of the human mind as expressed through common sense and 
insight. The principle helps to diffuse tendencies towards the totalitarian, 
the needlessly bureaucratic and the silly by providing endless checks 
against policies, principles, and programs that simply are not reasonable. 
Subsidiarity also recognizes that our capacity for speech grounds the 
specifically human character of our natural sociality. This understanding 
of humans as 'conversational' beings is the third element of subsidiarity'S 
anthropology. Once again, it is an insight with a long lineage. For 
example, as Aristotle observes in the Politics,44 unlike other animals, whose 
utterances are restricted to registering pleasure or pain, the human voice 
conveys some apprehension of the desirable and the hurtful. In fact, 
human community constitutes itself through agreement over these issues. 
However vaguely, people invoke notions of fairness or desirability 
whenever they attempt to achieve consensus or settle on the way to 
accomplish some task. Since speech is the vehicle by which we reveal our 
understandings and judgments; conversation is a normative activity. Our 
involvement in what the ancients termed the civilis ccmversatio thus 
actuates our capacity for self-rule. Of course, conversations are not 
conducted in a vacuum. Through its emphasis on mediating groups and 
its insistence in vesting authority at the lowest competent level, sub-
43 These points are treated extensively in Charles Taylor Sources of the Self: The Making 
of the Modem Identity (1989) (see especially 3--52) and Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue: 
A Study in Moral Theory 2d ed. (1984) (see especially 204-25). Also see Bernard J.F. 
Lonergan 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness' in Frederic E. Crowe (ed.) A 
Third Collection: Papers by BerTI4rd J.F. Lonergan (1985) 169. 
44 Book I, ch. 2, 1253a 5-20 
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sidiarity seeks to engage and take advantage of our natural sociality in a 
way that is consistent with our character as reasonable beings. 
In brief, the human good is both individual and socia1.45 Because 
humans live in groups, most of our operations as individuals take the 
form of cooperating with others. We work together in various ways to 
produce diverse goods that meet the needs of particular individuals. 
These particular goods are brought about through institutional frame-
works. Our social institutions - families, business organizations, the 
economy, the law, and the state - fix the patterns by which our coopera-
tive efforts regularly recur. Besides the· particular goods produced 
through our cooperative efforts, the order that patterns and sustains our 
cooperation is itself a good. This good can be called the good of order. 
A well-constituted order does two things: It patterns our operations in 
a cooperative way, thereby ensuring the continuous supply of the 
particular goods that people desire. Additionally, it enhances and sustains 
the commonality of understandings, sentiments, judgments, and goals 
that recurrent cooperation requires. Institutions represent the good of 
order, but the order itself results from the insight and resourcefulness of 
people as they attempt to work out common solutions to the ever-
changing circumstances of life together. People in a well-constituted 
order are joined by their needs and a common good of order that satis-
fies those needs. Among those needs is the drive to live and act reasonab-
ly, in the light of values that truly make sense. An order that sets the 
conditions for responsible individual self-rule promotes flexible and 
progressive cooperation. Such an order is a common good. It enhances 
the likelihood that choices about particular goods or activities will be 
made in the context of the whole. It thereby assists in keeping the 
individual and the social good aligned, and in ensuring that institutions 
serve rather than dominate individuals. 
Subsidiarity provides a maxim for devising well-constituted institution-
al orders. The principle, however, is formal rather than substantive. It 
represents a kind of heuristic device that guides deliberation, but does 
not attempt to stipulate the content of the results. Consistent with its view 
of the person, subsidiarity depends upon common sense and dialogue for 
its application. It is flexible rather than dogmatic, and emphasizes 
practice over programmatic versions of theoretical certainty and struc-
tural uniformity.46 Having described something of the character and 
45 For a funher explication of these points. see Bernard J.F. Lonergan Method in 
Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990) 47-59. 
46 On uniformity as an element of rationalism. and the rationalist distrust of practice 
and experience as sources of knowledge. see Michael Oakeshott 'Rationalism in 
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meaning of subsidiarity, it is appropriate briefly to sketch a few of the 
ways the Social Charter uses the principle. 
Subsidiarity in the Social Charter: The principle at work 
Since the adoption of the Social Charter, nearly all the discussion of 
subsidiarity has concentrated on the way the principle might function as 
a norm for structuring the relationship among the Community, the 
member nations, and their states or administrative regions." Because of 
this narrow focus on subsidiarity as a principle of Community federalism, 
remarkably little attention has been paid to the rich and nuanced manner 
in which the principle suffuses the Social Charter itself. Giving at best a 
thumbnail account of a few of these features, particularly as they affect 
corporate governance and employee voice, is the task of this section. 
To an American's eyes at least, one of the most striking things about 
the Social Charter is its strong affirmation and acceptance of the 
institution of collective bargaining. At a time when unions appear to be 
in a nearly irreversible state of decline in the United States,48 and when 
many American liberals and conservatives alike have declared collective 
bargaining a failed or irrelevant experiment, Europe's endorsement of 
the institution seems nothing less than extraordinary. Even more sur-
prising is the extent to which the Community has expressed its willing-
ness to rely on collective bargaining as a means both for implementing 
the Social Charter's principles as well as developing the substantive 
conditions of life in the social sphere. Thus, not only does the Charter 
guarantee the right of employers and workers to constitute trade organi-
zations 'for defense of their economic and social interests.'49 This idea is 
not wholly foreign to Americans, who typically are accustomed to think-
ing of collective bargaining strictly as an adversarial means through which 
employees pursue their monetary self-interest. The Social Charter and 
Politics' in Timothy Fuller (ed.) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Liberty Press 
1991) 5. 
47 See. e.g .• Bercusson, supra note 16; Hepple, supra note 16; Heintzen. supra note 
29; Schaefer, supra note 25; Watson, supra note 16. 
48 At present. only 11.9 per cent of the private sector workforce in the United States 
is organized. In 1930. with the depression in full swing and five years before the 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act (29 usC" §§ 151-64) (1982 & Supp. v 
1987). the rate stood at 10.2 per cent. See I. Bernstein The New Deal Collective 
Bargaining Policy (1950) 2. On the decline in union membership. see Richard 
Freeman and James Medoff What Do Unions Do? (1984) 221-45. 
49 Social Charter. Article 11 
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the Action Program50 that has been promulgated to implement the 
Charter's policies go further. They encourage 'social dialogue' - that is, 
collective bargaining - between the social partners at both the European 
level and within the member states. At the European level, this 'dialogue' 
may be on any topic;51 and can, 'if the two sides consider it desirable, lead 
to relations based on agreement.'52 In short, collective bargaining can act 
as a source of Community law. Moreover, both the Social Charter and 
the Community's Action Plan see collective bargaining as having a central 
place in the implementation and the further elaboration of the funda-
mental rights and policies stated in the Charter.55 Indeed, the Action 
Program specifically recognizes that implementation of the Social 
Charter's policies through collective agreements makes 'it possible to 
adapt to particular situations and enable[s] the two sides of industry to 
be actively involved.'54 
The continuous and active involvement of those directly affected in an 
ongoing discourse about the way their lives should be ordered is a key 
feature of subsidiarity, as is the policy of encouraging the shift of 
responsibility to the lowest grass-roots level possible. Similarly reflective 
of the subsidiarity principle is the Social Charter's explicit recognition 
that 'social consensus contributes to the strengthening of the competitive-
50 Title 11 of the Social Charter addresses the Charter's implementation. The pertinent 
articles provide as follows. Article 27: 'It is more particularly the responsibility of 
the Member States, in accordance with national practices, notably through legislative 
measures or collective agreements, to guarantee the fundamental socia1 rights in this 
Charter and to implement the socia1 measures indispensable to the smooth 
operation of the internal market as part of a strategy of economic and social 
cohesion.' Article 28: 'The European Council invites the Commission to submit as 
soon as possible initiatives which fall within its powers, as provided for in the 
Treaties, with a view to the adoption of legal instruments for the effective 
implementation, as and when the internal market is completed, of those rights 
which come within the Community's area of competence.' The Action Plan (Com 
(89) 568) was promulgated pursuant to Article 28. For a summary of the Action 
Plan, see 'Social Charter: Action Programme Released' Uanuary 1990) EUT. Industrial 
Rel. Rev. 11. 
51 See Hepple, supra note 16, 651. It is interesting to contrast this attitude towards 
'social dialogue' with the American approach to bargaining, which through doctrines 
like the mandatory-permissive distinction seek to cabin the scope of discussion (on 
the distinction, see note 56, infra). Also demonstrative of the American attitude 
towards the institution of collective bargaining in the us Supreme Court's opinion 
in Longshoremen v. AUied IntematWnal, Inc. 456 us 212, 226 (1982). Here, the Court 
condemned what it admitted was a political protest by a union because such pro-
tests 'were far removed from what has traditionally been thought to be the realm 
of legitimate union activity.' On this matter, see Kohler, supra note 38, 193-8. 
52 Article 118B, EEC Treaty, supra note 21 
53 See Bercusson, supra note 16, 627-8, 641-2; Hepple, supra note 16, 651-2. 
54 Action Program, Com (89) 568 Part I, 4 
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ness of undertakings, of the economy as a whole ... and to the creation 
of employment [and] is an essential condition for ensuring sustained 
economic development.'55 
The Charter's emphasis on the discourse and its broad willingness to 
rely on the 'social dialogue' as a vital means for ordering stands in a 
sharp contrast to the desiccated and overly juridified shell of what 
collective bargaining has become in the United States. Indeed, instead of 
a normative dialogue between 'social partners,' it is much more typical in 
the United States to regard bargaining as an adversarial contest between 
wholly self-interested parties which the law seeks to contain and limit 
through complex and highly technical doctrines such as the distinction 
between mandatory and permissive topics56• European politicians57 and 
scholars58 alike long have shown a substantial interest in the us version 
of 'free'59 collective bargaining, which might best be characterized as a 
system of autonomous self-regulation or, as Gunther Tuebner calls it, a 
system of reflexive law. It is one of history's little ironies that the United 
States seems intent on abandoning this institution at a time when Europe 
has begun to experiment with many of its core features. Indeed, rather 
55 Social Charter, Preamble, paragraph 5 
56 In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. 356 us 342 (1958) the us Supreme 
Court construed the National Labor Relations Act to contain a distinction between 
mandatory and permissive bargaining topics, holding that parties legally are 
required only to bargain over the former. Consequently, the status of a topic 
depends ultimately upon its characterization by the judiciary. The real significance 
of this case does not lie in its impact on the identity of the subjects with which the 
parties deal. Rather, this case and its progeny have afforded the Court a means to 
shape for itself - and for the readers of its opinions - a view about the nature of 
the Labor Act's lawmaking processes and the types of issues capable of being 
handled within it. Likewise, these cases have influenced views about the types of 
concerns about which employee associations appropriately and legitimately may 
speak. To a large extent then, the Borg-Warner line of cases has created a vicious 
circle in which the Court's understanding about the purposes and functions of 
unions and collective bargaining is based upon its own characterization of them. 
57 On France's encouragement of the use of this model in the 'Auroux' laws as an 
alternative to the previous legal models, see Mary Ann Glendon 'French Labor 
Law Reform 1982-1983: The Struggle for Collective Bargaining' (1984) 32 Am. J. 
Compo L. 449. In 1990, the French Labor Ministry reported that bargaining activity 
- 'social dialogue' - in the previous three years had reached levels that met the 
aims of the 1982 Auroux laws. For a summary, see 'France: Collective Bargaining 
in 1990' (July 1991) Eur. Industrial &l. Rev. 17-9. 
58 Glendon, supra note 57; Gunther Teubner 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law' (1983) 17 Law & Soc. Rev. 239. Also see Gunther Teubner (ed.) 
juridifacation of Social Spheres: A ComparaJive Analysis in the Areas of Labor, CorporaJe, 
Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (1987). 
59 That is, characterized by a lack of state intervention in the substantive results of the 
process 
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than a 'convergence' of legal systems, something of a 'transference' of 
orders seems at least potentially to be underway. Thus, the employment 
relationship in the United States is ever increasingly being subjected to 
extensive (if piecemeal) direct state regulation, while the stated desire of 
the Social Charter is to nudge the European Community states in the 
opposite direction. 
The Social Charter's guarantee of information, consultation, and 
participation in management represents a second area in which the 
subsidiarity principle can be found at work.60 Once again, the emphasis 
is on promoting discourse and institutional arrangements that furnish 
individuals with the opportunity and responsibility to take part in making 
decisions that affect their day-to-day existence. Thus, while the Charter 
specifies no comprehensive list of topics, it does provide that 'informa-
tion, consultation and participation' must occur over technological 
changes, operational restructurings, or mergers that will have an impact 
on the availability of employment.61 
Consistent with subsidiarity's stress on practice and flexibility over 
structural uniformity, the Charter dictates no particular form of 
participation scheme that member states must adopt. Instead, the Charter 
simply provides that information and participation schemes 'must be 
developed along appropriate lines, taking into account the practices in 
force in various Member StateS.'62 Here again, 'practices' appears to imply 
that collective agreements are an appropriate source of law, and the 
dialogue between the social partners constitutes a valid and desirable 
means for making it.63 . 
Although not part of the Social Charter's scheme, the EC'S proposed 
European Company statute represents yet another instance of subsidi-
arity's application to and influence over corporate arrangements.54 Any 
60 Sociru Charter, Articles 17, 18 
61 Sociru Charter, Article 18 
62 Sociru Charter, Article 17 
63 See Bercusson, supra note 16, 627-8, 641-2; Hepple, supra note 15, 651-2. The 
Council has ruso prepared a draft Directive on 'European Works Councils' that, if 
adopted, basically would require undertakings with 1,000 employees and operations 
in more than one member state to establish a co-determination scheme. See 'EEC: 
Draft Directive on European Works Councils' (March 1991) EUT. Industrial Rei. Rep. 
12-4, 29-33. (Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, Directives are 'binding as to the 
results to be achieved: but 'leave to the nationru authorities the choice of form 
and method.') 
64 For a summary of the Statute and a substantiru extraction of its provisions, see 'EEC: 
Commission Proposes European Company Statute' (September 1982) EUT. Industrial. 
Rei. Rev. 2; 'EEC: European Company Statute' (December 1989) EUT. Industrial. Rei. 
Rev. 28-31; Oanuary 1990) 26-8; (February 1990) 29-31. 
HeinOnline -- 43 U. Toronto L.J. 625 1993
REPRESENTATION AND VOICE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 625 
detailed account of the statute far exceeds . the confined limits of this 
paper. Briefly stated, the statute broadly parallels and supports the 
worker consultation and participation guarantees stated in the Social 
Charter. 
The proposed statute would govern 'European companies' that choose 
to organize themselves directly under Community law rather than the 
law of one of the member states. The statute as currently proposed 
requires such companies to guarantee worker consultation information 
and participation rights, and provides three participatory models from 
which to choose. Again, consistent with the subsidiarity principle, the 
draft statute emphasiz!!s employee participation in decisions which affect 
one's day-to-day conditions. Hence, the proposed participatory models 
focus on giving employees voice in strategic decisions, including 
relocations, mergers, joint ventures, and corporate reorganizations. Once 
again, the proposed statute affords one form of participation to be 
established through collective bargaining. 
The lessons of subsidiarity 
Before briefly considering a few of the lessons subsidiarity holds for us, 
it might be worth recalling why we value free-market economic arrange-
ments in the first place. Certainly, it is not for the sake of the market or 
of competition in and of themselves. Instead, it is because free-markets 
promote individual determination and material well-being, both of which 
are conditions for political liberty and self-rule. Hence, as Adam Smith 
observed, there is a reflexive relationship between market arrangements 
and liberal social institutions. The two need and support one another.65 
Consequently, Milton Friedman properly warns us that 'capitalism is a 
necessary condition for political freedom' but 'it is not a sufficient 
condition.'66 Subsidiarity focuses on the sorts of arrangements that suffice 
to promote the full realization of the common good in all of its aspects, 
including the economic and the political. 
As Maitland observed, the state and corporations of every description 
consist of the same thing - human beings. Because human character does 
not change, the subsidarity principle applies to corporate orders of every 
sort. However, although human nature is a constant, the situations that 
65 This is one of the key teachings of The Wealth of Nations. In fact. Smith never refers 
to capitalism. but to 'the system of natural liberty: An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) part I. ch. x. For similar insights. see Alfred 
Marshall Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume 8th ed. (1948) 1-13. 
66 Capitalism and Freedom (1982) 10 
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humans encounter and the contexts within which they operate are ever-
changing. As a result, subsidarity does not represent a defined set of 
organizational structures or procedural formulations that are ready for 
off-the-shelf adoption. . 
So, what does the principle do for us? What does it have to offer? The 
key idea subsidarity affords is a more nuanced way to think about human 
character and the relationship between our institutions and individual 
well-being. The principle also constantly recalls to us the most basic 
purpose for which our institutions exist. Briefly stated, subsidarity's 
intense practicality lies in. the guidance it provides for establishing 
institutional orders that are consistent with our human character. Thus, 
the principle gives a new and more flexible starting point for thinking 
about corporate structures of every type. 
In concrete terms, subsidarity suggests the sorts of contributions that 
a revivified and less adversarially oriented system of collective bargaining 
(or 'social dialogue') might make to affording employees 'voice,' while 
advancing the conditions for cooperation and organizational effectiveness. 
It also implies roles for unions and other sorts of employee associations 
that go beyond simply acting as economic self-interest groups, while 
pointing out the possibilities that may inhere in works councils and other 
forms for employee representation. Moreover, subsidiarity offers a real 
alternative to the ever-increasing trend in the United States towards state 
regulation of the employment relationship and the sorts of rigidity that 
such regulation brings. 
The point of this brief recitation is not to engage in 'the foolish search 
for institutions to import from elsewhere' against which Lord Wedder-
burn warned, but to stretch our imagination as he counseled. Specific 
patterns of ordering that work in one place may not fit another. 
However, the need for new ways of thinking about the good of order 
never has been more acute. 
In the twilight years of this century, we have become well aware of 
the enervating effects that flow from over-reliance on state institutions. 
What we frequently tend to miss is that over-reliance on 'private' 
institutions produces the same effects. We are not different creatures 
when dealing with the state than we are when dealing with 'private' 
institutions. Nor does the character of dependence change because that 
dependence is upon a corporate body rather than the state. As Toc-
queville so clearly understood, individuals and society alike become self-
governing only by regularly and repeatedly engaging in acts of self-
determination. It is the habit that sustains the condition. Consequently 
a democracy encounters its greatest danger of being perverted when 
individuals no longer have direct responsibility for making the day-to-
day decisions about the order of their lives. 
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This doesn't mean that corporations must somehow take on the 
trappings of a representative democracy or put decisions to a vote of the 
'citizens.' It does mean that as corporations become increasingly 
independent of the state, and as the power of initiative becomes more 
and more theirs, subsidiarity should progressively become a more 
prominent concern. To overlook its guidance puts at risk all the goods 
that free markets are intended to achieve, while undermining over the 
long run the conditions that any organization requires to sustain itself. 
Of course, whether the rich potential of the subsidiarity principle will 
be realized through the Charter's scheme remains an open question. 
Certainly, it faces some formidable obstacles. First, the Charter and the 
Action Plan contain some structural weaknesses that may over the long 
run undermine the existence of autonomous unions on which the 
effectuation of an authentic regime of subsidiarity depends.s7 Another, 
more generalized danger presents itself in the possibility of overreaching 
on the part of Commission and its now infamous 'technocrats.' It is quite 
possible for the libido dominandi of the bureaucrats to cloak itself in the 
principle, and in the name of 'subsidiarity' to centralize much decision-
making in Brussels on the basis that the tasks so assumed could not be 
performed effectively by smaller or more localized bodies. 
The most formidable and deeply embedded obstacle, however, lies in 
the strong tendency of modern capitalism to overwhelm and eventually 
to dissolve the discrete, the local, and the particular. Yet it is these very 
grass-roots institutions - which Edmund Burke called the 'little platoons' 
of social life - that ground a democracy.68 They are the places where the 
habits of self-rule are practiced and learned. 
In substantial part, the European Community represents an effort to 
erect the large commercial republic of The Federalist Papers - but without 
the enormous hostility towards intermediate groups that characterizes The 
Federalist's project. In essence, the Social Charter and its subsidiarity 
principle stand as an attempt to accommodate modern markets to the 
mediating bodies that root civic life. Achieving that accommodation will 
be a delicate and constant task and will require the exercise of authentic 
practical wisdom. Whether local institutions can be preserved in the face 
67 See Stephen J. Silva 'The Social Charter of the European Community: A Defeat for 
European Labor' (1991) 44 Industrial & Lab. &l. Rev. 626; Lord Wedderburn of 
Charlton 'European Community Law and Workers Rights: Fact or Fake in 1992?' 
(1991) 13 U. Dublin LR 1. 
68 Cf. Raymond Aron 'Une Citoyennete Multinationale est-elle Possible?' (Hiver 
1991-92) 56 CmiJmentairl! 695 
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of the centripetal forces exerted by modern markets remains unclear.69 
One thing, however, is certain: Institutional orders inconsistent with 
human character will not survive. Consequently, the most pressing 
question of our time is whether, and the degree to which, our notions of 
the human person are accurate. Everything turns on our answer to this 
query. 
69 On these points. see 'Proceedings of the Symposium on Individualism and 
Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommoda-
tions' (1993) Brigham Young U. LR (forthcoming). 
